On top of placing him on waivers, they haven’t used him much.
When the San Francisco Giants placed a trio of players on waivers the other day, it continued a string of decision-making that proved their internal projections mirrored the public-facing odds reporting that they were not going to the playoffs. It also demonstrated that the team has yet another free agent signing on the books that it regrets.
Taylor Rogers and the $2 million he’s still owed this season and the $12 million he’s owed next season are two bits of money the Giants don’t want a part of not because they think the veteran deserves to join a playoff-bound team but because they don’t have much use for him — and also, maybe they’ll get lucky and shave a little more off the tax bill they’ll owe MLB after the season for exceeding the first level of the competitive balance tax threshold.
But the willingness to jettison the player isn’t because of future planning, it’s about past regrets. It’s either a total whiff in evaluation from the outset or an implacable set of circumstances they’ve faced ever since they got him into the organization and could evaluate him with their own coaches and metrics.
You’ll recall that in year one of the deal, it started out disastrously, with the Dodgers embarrassing him in early April, causing him to commit gloveicide:
This happened in the 6th inning of a game because prior to that, in the 8th and the 7th, Rogers hadn’t looked sharp enough to put guys away and his velocity was down. Indeed, Rogers’ velocity shows a pretty obvious decline: 94.8 mph with the sinker in 2019, 94.6 in 2020, an uptick to 95.7 in 2021, then a drop down to 94.3 in 2022, then 93.6 in 2023.
In 2024, it’s averaging 93.1. But about last season for a moment: we saw Rogers recover from the glove death outing to have a decent season. In 47 games following that appearance, he posted a 1.50 ERA (2.66 FIP) in 42 IP with 54 K against just 16 walks, allowing just 2 home runs and 7 earned runs. But in September it came crashing back down to earth (11.37 ERA / 5.94 FIP in 6.1 IP). He worked his way back from being a middle-inning reliever to a late game reliever only to lose the role again.
That all tracks with the previous coaching staff, though. They might’ve been confident they could restore his velocity after what they did with Sean Manaea. But it seems clear that the way 2023 ended for Rogers carried over to the Giants’ offseason planning because it’s rare when he makes late game appearances these days.
For a guy who was signed to be a backup closer, he’s been far removed from that position, even as the Giants suffered an emergency there. Just 21 of his 54 appearances have come in the 8th inning or later. Last year, it was 32 of 60.
So, the Giants whiffed on their evaluation. They thought they were getting — or would be able to coach back up to the level of — a 3.00 FIP guy like the Rogers who pitched from 2016-2021. Instead, he’s more of a 3.70/4.00 FIP reliever now; and, to add insult to injury, he’s a lefty reliever with a reverse platoon split:
vs. RHB: .221/.271/.398
vs LHB: .273/.356/.416
That’s never been the case with him, but at the same time, it’s not unbelievable that a 33-year old reliever declines. The velocity drop is unsurprising, too, but this year they have a previous generation coaching staff versus the “next gen” one they had previously and so in both situations (strategy and biometrics) the team is helpless to make any real fixes.
Still, it’s very clear that Rogers was not the guy the team had in mind when they signed him to one of the largest reliever deals in recent memory and it’s hard to believe the Giants’ internal projections missed the mark by so much. Not for a team that’s supposed to be all about the projections. Could this be a consequence of prioritizing computer scouting over human scouting?
Taylor Rogers joins an extensive list of free agent patch jobs that didn’t quite hold up. His 0.6 fWAR total across nearly 2 seasons is… not good. If we’re sorting free agent signings by successes and failures, Rogers is in the Ross Stripling, Mitch Haniger, Tom Murphy, Alex Wood (the extension years), Anthony DeSclafani (the extension years), Luke Jackson, Tommy La Stella failure pile.
[The success pile is open to interpretation, of course, but Carlos Rodon, Joc Pederson, Michael Conforto, and John Brebbia all belong in it, I think — just to give you a sense of what I’m going for here.]
And I don’t think these piles reflect perfect hindsight, just as this year’s overall outcome isn’t actually surprising. Anyone paying attention feared the ramifications of the pitching plan (and the hiring of Bryan Price as part of it). Rogers’ performance in 2022 and obvious velocity decline were reasons to not give him a massive deal, just as Stripling’s one-year wonderful performance, and the injury histories attached to Haniger, Murphy, La Stella, Wood, DeSclafani made them bad bets.
But by the Giants’ actions before, during, and after acquiring certain players, we can divine their process. They are taking the Moneyball approach to the extreme: what if we bet on misfit toys? Some of those might payoff? Unfortunately, the misfit part is largely “broken or prone to breaking,” and only occasionally of the strict platoon variety. This is a bit different from the Michael Lewis book, but it makes sense. The truly funky guys who don’t have health problems are sought after more often and harder to get, especially in the quantities the Giants need them.
They’re effectively cornering the market on injury guys because they can’t do a full on tank or teardown to rebuild depth in other ways. The backup to that plan is purging these deals whenever possible as soon as it’s clear that they won’t work out. That’s definitely a workable strategy if you’re trying to compete while rebuilding, but three years after an historic winning season, we’re seeing the limits of this process. It’s indistinguishable from throwing spaghetti at the wall to see what sticks. That thinking works best in comedy, but I think it’s worth more discussion in the coming months to explore both strategies: what’s the harm in a one-year tank job vs. contending while rebuilding?
But what’s the John Wooden quote? “Don’t mistake activity for achievement”? That’s what this can feel like when things don’t work out. Things haven’t been working out, and so it’s hard to argue that the Giants have achieved very much beyond having a lot of regrets when it comes to signing free agents.